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MEKANISME CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, MANAJEMEN LABA DAN KINERJA KEUANGAN

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Simposium Nasional Akuntansi 10 Makassar

MEKANISME CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, MANAJEMEN LABA

DAN KINERJA KEUANGAN

( Studi Pada Perusahaan go publik Sektor Manufaktur )

MUH. ARIEF UJIYANTHO

STIE Muhammadiyah Pekalongan

BAMBANG AGUS PRAMUKA

Universitas Jenderal Soedirman Purwokerto

ABSTRACT

The objective of this study is to examine the influence of corporate governance mechanism, namely institutional ownership, managerial ownership, presence of independent of director and size of director to earnings management. This study also examines influence concequensies of earnings management to financial performance. This study takes sample from 30 companies in the manufacturing sector at the Jakarta Stock Exchange, which were published in financial report from 2001-2004. The method of analysis of this research used multi regression and single regression.

The results of this study show that (1) institutional ownership had not significant influence to earnings management, (2) managerial ownership had negative significant influence to earnings management, (3) presence of independent of director had positive significant influence to earnings management, (4) size of director had not significant influence to earnings management, (5) simultaneously of institutional ownership, managerial ownership, presence of independent of director and size of director had significant influence to earnings management, and (6) earnings management had not significant influence to financial performance.

Key Words: Corporate Governance Mechanism, Earnings Management, Financial Performance

I. INTRODUCTION

In agency theory (agency theory), the agency relationship arises when one or more persons (principals) hire another person (agent) to provide a service and then delegate authority to the agent the decision-making (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Manager as the manager of the company know more internal information and the company’s prospects in the future than the owners (shareholders). Therefore, as manager, the manager is obliged to give a signal about the condition of the company to the owners. However, sometimes the information is not received in accordance with the actual condition of the company. This condition is known as asymmetric information or asymmetric information (asymmetric information) (Haris, 2004). Asymmetry between management (agent) with the owners (principals) can provide the opportunity for managers to manage earnings (earnings management) (Richardson, 1998).

Measures of earnings management has led to several cases of accounting reporting scandals, is widely known, among others, Enron, Merck, World Com and the majority of other companies in the United States (Cornett, Marcuss, Saunders and Tehranian, 2006). Some cases that occurred in Indonesia, including PT. Lippo Tbk and PT. Kimia Farma Tbk also involve financial reporting (financial reporting) which originated from undetected manipulation (Gideon, 2005).

*Simposium Nasional Akuntansi 10 Makassar*

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Manajemen Laba Pada Perusahaan yang Melanggar Perjanjian Utang

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Simposium Nasional Akuntansi 10 Makassar

MANAJEMEN LABA PADA PERUSAHAAN YANG MELANGGAR PERJANJIAN UTANG*

NURUL HERAWATI

Politeknik YDHI Yogyakarta

ZAKI BARIDWAN

Universitas Gadjah Mada Yogyakarta

ABSTRACT

This research aims to give empirical evidence concerning earnings management in firms violating debt covenant and to test whether earnings management in those firms are larger than that in control firms. Research population is manufacturing company listed at Bursa Efek Jakarta. The sample includes 13 firms violating debt covenant and 20 firms as control firms. The sampling method is purposive sampling. Method of statistics used is t-test.

The statistic test of first hypothesis shows that mean of discretionary accruals at a year before violation is significantly larger than that at the year debt covenant violation. This result supports debt covenant hypothesis. But, mean difference at the year of violation and at a year after violation does not provide the support for the hypothesis. The statistic test of second hypothesis shows that mean of discretionary accruals of firms violating debt covenant at a year before and at the year violation of debt covenant is not significantly larger than that of control firms. Thus, we can conclude that there are other factors besides violation of debt covenant that motivate management to perform earnings management.

Keywords: Earnings Management, Debt Covenant Hypothesis, Debt Covenant Violation, Discretionary Accruals.

 

* This research is a principal investigator in the Masters thesis, Saint Universitas Gadjah Mada. I offer the thanks to Prof.. Dr. Baridwan Zaki, M. Sc thesis as mentors for advice, time and discussion. AKPM-02 1

I. Background

Agency theory see the company as a nexus of contracts is an organization under contract with several parties such as contracts with shareholders, suppliers, employees (including managers) and other parties involved (Scott, 2000). The Company also has contractual ties with the creditors if the company is involved as one of the debt financing. Most companies use debt as the source of funding because it can improve performance of managers due to fears of job losses and if the performance increase, shareholders are willing to pay its share price is more expensive (Jensen and Meckling 1976 in Main 2000).

Companies that have debt contracts and other contracts would wish to minimize the cost associated with contract contract-contract (contracting theory), such as negotiation kos, kos monitoring contract performance, the possibility of renegotiation, and the cost estimates if bankruptcy or other failure (Scott , 2000). Therefore, we need a tool to assess the performance of companies in an effort to protect the interests of both parties are bound by a contract (to minimize conflicts of interest). The tool of any information generated internally by the company.

*Simposium Nasional Akuntansi 10 Makassar

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PENDETEKSIAN EARNINGS MANAGEMENT, UNDERPRICING DAN PENGUKURAN KINERJA PERUSAHAAN YANG MELAKUKAN KEBIJAKAN INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERING (IPO)

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PENDETEKSIAN EARNINGS MANAGEMENT, UNDERPRICING DAN PENGUKURAN KINERJA PERUSAHAAN YANG MELAKUKAN KEBIJAKAN INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERING (IPO) DI INDONESIA

AMINUL AMIN

STIE Malangkucecwara, Malang

ABSTRACT

Earnings Management, underpricing and performance of company joining policy of IPO draw to be studied. Differ from research Husnan ( 1996) to research phenomenon of underpricing of moment IPO, Nasirwan ( 2002) testing performance of pasca IPO, and Candy ( 2002) testing performance operate for and the finance performance, this research extend examination to phenomenon of earnings management, underpricing and company performance ( finance, market) together.

As much 31 company conducting IPO in Jakarta Stock Exchange in research of during period 1990 up to 2001, with unit analysis of during 6 year consisted of 3 year before IPO and 3 year after IPO, so that there is 186 unit analysis.

Result of examination indicate that mean discretionary accrual is positive, what indication that company executing IPO of indication do policy of earnings management three year before IPO and three year after IPO by playing component accruals. But discretionary accrual before IPO and after IPO not differ, this matter indicate that company still continue policy of earnings management at least until three year after IPO.

Furthermore examination to underpricing using initial return ( Rt), proving that company executing IPO experience of underpricing on first when share traded in market sekunder. Mean of Initial return on first of trading in capital market is positive, even happened positive return until the third month a period of trading, afterthat happened degradation of return by the end of year (December).

Although there no difference which signifikan of performance of finance before and after IPO, result of examination prove that company executing IPO experience of degradation of performance of finance, whereas performance of market show there is difference of return [of] before IPO by return [is] first day [of] trading [in] Stock Exchange Market, and there is downhill tendency after IPO especially by the end of year.

If connected third the above phenomenon, in general the researcher cannot prove relation between policy earnings management, phenomenon underpricing, and the company market performance and finance performance conducting IPO.

Keywords: Initial Public Offerings (IPO), Earnings Management, underpricing and performance of company

INTRODUCTION

Companies that will go public usually begins with a decision to conduct an initial public Offerings (IPO) conducted in the primary market (primary market). Subsequently, these shares will be traded in perjual-called capital market or secondary market (secondary market). Shares at an initial offering price is determined by agreement between the company issuers with securities underwriter (an underwriter) as the required funds, issuers want high initial price. Conversely, an underwriter as underwriter seeks to minimize the risk of bear. In this type of comitment full underwriting, the underwriter will purchase the shares not sold in the primary market. These circumstances make the underwriters are not willing to buy stocks that are not sold. Efforts is to negotiate with the issuer so that these shares are not too high a price, even likely underpriced.

Underpricing is an interesting phenomenon because it experienced by most of the world’s capital markets. Since it is often in the primary market (IPOs) are found of underpricing (Ritter, 1991; McGuinnes, 1992; Husnan, 1993; Aggrawal, et al., 1993; Ernyan and Husnan, 2002). Research conducted by Aggrawal, et Al. (1993) concluded that the IPO in the short term indicated the occurrence of underpricing, but in the long term return that is negative going. This underpricing profitable investors on the one hand but on the other hand would be detrimental to the issuer because the funds collected are not maximal.

*Simposium Nasional Akuntansi 10 Makassar

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INVESTIGASI MOTIVASI DAN STRATEGI MANAJEMEN LABA PADA PERUSAHAAN PUBLIK DI INDONESIA

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INVESTIGASI MOTIVASI DAN STRATEGI MANAJEMEN LABA PADA PERUSAHAAN PUBLIK DI INDONESIA

KOMARUDIN ACHMAD

IMAM SUBEKTI

SARI ATMINI

Universitas Brawijaya Malang

[Simposium Nasional Akuntansi 10 Makassar]

ABSTRACT

This study investigates the existence of earnings management motivations and strategies. Based on ordinary least square regression, this study indicates that debt covenant and political cost motivations affect earnings management. However, bonus plan motivation and accounting method choice strategy do not affect earnings management. Investigation on earnings management practices explains that bonus plan motivation affect income increasing, not income decreasing.

This study finds that the managers of public firms in Indonesia do not use accounting method choices as earnings management strategy. Some of them choose to use a little of accruals accounting flexibility and prefer both GAAP violations and intercompany transactions strategies. This study identifies that the motivations of debt covenant, political cost and owners’ wealth as well as the strategy of accruals accounting flexibility are earnings management practices with global value. Otherwise, earnings management practices with local value consist of motivation caused by both debt restructuring and going concern constraint and strategy through GAAP violations and intercompany transactions.

Key Words: Earnings management, Motivation, Bonus plan, Debt covenant, Political cost, Owners’ wealth, Debt restructuring, Going concern, Strategy, Accounting method choice, Accruals accounting flexibility, GAAP violations, Intercompany transactions, Global value, Local value

* The names of companies and related parties has been modified for the purposes of this research. We appreciates the various parties who have been providing input to this research.

****

The financial statements have been prepared on the accrual basis of accounting (accruals accounting). Accrual accounting has the advantage that the company’s earnings and its components measured by accrual accounting generally provides a better indication about the economic performance of companies than the information generated from the aspects of current receipts and payments (FASB 1978). Accrual accounting also has weaknesses. Wild et al. (2003) criticized that accrual accounting is not perfect and the rules that obscure the financial report which aims to provide cash flow information and company capabilities in generating cash. Vagueness of this information due to accrual accounting is complicated and vulnerable to manipulation. This vulnerability is called management earnings (earnings management).

The presence of motivation and opportunities as incentives for managers to manage earnings. According to Scott (2000), motivation for earnings management include bonus plans, debt covenants, and political cost. Managers are motivated to manage earnings to achieve performance targets and bonus compensation, minimize the possibility of debt covenant violations, and minimize the political cost because of government intervention and the parliament.

* Simposium Nasional Akuntansi 10 Makassar

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Pengaruh Struktur Kepemilikan Perusahaan Dan Transaksi Dengan Pihak-Pihak Yang Memiliki Hubungan Istimewa Terhadap Daya Informasi Akuntansi

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Pengaruh Struktur Kepemilikan Perusahaan Dan Transaksi Dengan Pihak-Pihak Yang Memiliki Hubungan Istimewa Terhadap Daya Informasi Akuntansi

YIE TO FELIANA, SE, M. COM, AK, CPA

FE-UBAYA

ABSTRACT

This research studies the effect of ownership structure and related party transactions on the informativeness of accounting numbers. Indonesian sample is interesting to be examined due to low quailty of accounting numbers, concentrated ownership, family control and high-dominant related party transactions. Using the model levels and changes models, studies show That this concentration of ownership increases informativeness of the accounting numbers to the capital market. However, concentrated ownership by family or the informativeness of accounting numbers decreases to the capital market. Further, the magnitude of related party transactions That has been earned or Used, as reported in one of income statement accounts, increases informativeness of accounting numbers. Otherwise, the magnitude of related party transactions That has not earned or Used, as reported in one of balance sheet accounts, Decrease informativeness of accounting numbers.

Key words: accounting information resources, concentration of ownership, family control, transactions with related parties

*****

Since 1994, Indonesian accounting standards have been prepared with reference to internationally accepted accounting standards (Internatioanal Accounting Standards / IAS or converted into International Financial Reporting Standards / IFRS since 2001). However, several studies provide evidence that the quality of accounting information in Indonesia is still low. Based on the Price Water House Coopers survey in 1999 in the eyes of international investors, Indonesia is one of the worst countries in terms of “in standards of auditing and compliance, accountability to shareholders, standards of disclosure and transparency and Board processes (PWC, 1999). Graham and King (2000) discovered the power of information in accounting numbers to the market price is relatively low compared with Asian countries is another. Accounting information resources in Indonesia are under the state of the Philippines, Thailand and Korea. Leeuz et al. (2002) found that the level of earnings management in Indonesia is relatively high (ranked the 15th largest among the 31 countries) using data between 1990 and 1999. The ranking of earnings management in Indonesia to Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines.

The low quality of accounting information in Indonesia, although it has been adopting international accounting standards is not only happening in Indonesia. Ball et al (2000) showed that the adoption of international accounting standards does not by itself guarantee a high level of transparency as has occurred in four countries: Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand.

*Simposium Nasional Akuntansi 10 Makassar

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