KEPEMILIKAN MANAJEMEN, KEPEMILIKAN INSTITUSI, LEVERAGE DAN CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
(FE Universitas Swadaya Gunung Jati, Cirebon)
(FE Universitas Sultan Ageng Tirtayasa, Banten)
The objective of this study was to analyze the influence of management ownership, institution ownership, and leverage on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). The analysis used control variable of total asset, market value upon book value, return change, and factory’s age. Using the control variables, it was hoped that the analysis result could eliminate the mistakes in drawing the conclusion.
The sample used here was the secondary data from Bursa Efek Indonesia (BEI/Indonesia Exchange Stock), i.e. the annual report of manufacturers listed in 2005 to 2007 in BEI. The sample was taken using the method of purposive sampling, and those meeting the selection criteria were also taken. The sample used was of 81 manufacturers. The statistics method used here was multiplied analysis linear regression, with hypotheses testing of statistic t and F tests. The result of analysis based on the use of all control variables suggested that the management ownership had significant influence on CSR, and the institution ownership and leverage, on the other hand, had no significant influence on CSR.
Keywords : Corporate Social Responsibility, Management ownership, Institution ownership, Leverage.
Enactment of Law No.40 of 2007 regarding Limited Liability Company (Company Law), then the CSR (corporate social responsibility) or corporate social responsibility, which previously was a voluntary thing that will turn into a matter that must be implemented.
Employers argue that CSR should not be enforced because it is voluntary and becomes part of corporate strategy. CSR requires the company set aside funds violate human rights (human rights) and against the interests of shareholders because it will increase the cost (costs) and lower corporate profits. Decline in earnings impact on the amount of dividends received by shareholders and the company’s equity value.
Company’s long-term goal is to optimize the value of the company. Jensen (2001) stated that in order to maximize corporate value in the long run (not only the value of equity, but also all financial claims such as debt, warrants, or preferred stock) managers are required to make decisions that take into account the interests of all stakeholders, so that managers will be judged based on their performance ability to achieve objectives or able to implement strategies to achieve this goal. Pooling the interests of shareholders, debtholders, and management that are parties who have an interest in the company’s goal often creates problems (agency problem). Agency problem can be affected by the ownership structure of (managerial ownership and institutional ownership).
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